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Abstract
The progress of the social science disciplines depends on conducting relevant 
research. However, research methodology adopted and choices made during 
the course of the research project are underpinned by varying ontological, 
epistemological and axiological positions that may be known or unknown to the 
researcher. This paper sought to critically explore the philosophical underpinnings of 
the social science research. It was suggested that a “multiversal” ontological position, 
positivist-hermeneutic epistemological position and value-laden axiological position 
should be adopted for social science research by non-western scholars as alternative to 
the dominant naïve realist, positivist, and value-free orientation. Against the backdrop 
of producing context-relevant knowledge, non-western scholars are encouraged to 
re-examine their philosophical positions in the conduct of social science research. 
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Introduction 
At the heart of social science is research. Indeed, it is research that distinguishes social 
studies from the social sciences. Whether publicly acknowledged or not, each research 
project in the social science is underpinned some epistemological, ontological, and 
axiological positions. Ontology is the philosophical position about the nature of reality 
whiles epistemology focuses on what constitutes valid knowledge and how we can 
obtain such knowledge (West & Turner, 2000; Oppong, 2013).  They further describe axiology 
as the philosophical position that addresses itself to the place of value in theory and 
research. 
Similarly, in an examination of the epistemological Smith and Darlington (1996) views 
that philosophical questions of ontology as perceptions about the world (realism 
or idealism) and identified epistemological questions relating to origin of behaviour 
(determinism or free-will) and nature of the mind (materialism or mentalism). These 
philosophical positions inform choices made in terms of research design and tools for 
data collection as well as data analysis techniques adopted in social science research. 
However, these underlying philosophies promote subtly the dominant Eurocentric 
perspective that often serves to undermine endogenous systems for knowledge 
production. The purpose of this paper is to provide a critique of the dominant 
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philosophies that are adopted in social science research globally with the objective of 
providing alternative perspectives that are more decolonial in nature. 
Philosophical Underpinnings
As stated earlier, social science research is underpinned by different ontological, 
epistemological, and axiological positions and that their relationships may be 
conceptualized as in the figure below. In Figure 1, philosophical psychology refers to 
the ethno-philosophy.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philosophical psychology
Axiological Position Ontological Position
Epistemological Position
Research Methodology 
Figure 1: Relationship between the Various Philosophical Positions Underlying Social Science 
Research1
Figure 1 suggests that the ontological position adopted by the social science researcher 
influences his or her choice of an epistemological position. In addition, the research 
methodology adopted is influenced by the epistemology. This indicates that lying 
deep underneath the decisions about research methodology are the ontological and 
epistemological positions. Again, the ontology and epistemology are influenced by 
the axiological positions which are also influenced by the philosophical psychology or 
ethno-philosophies of the researchers. 
However, the dominant ethno-philosophy influencing social science researchers is 
western-centric. Noting that the mainstream body of knowledge of the social science 
disciplines does not serve non-western societies well (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Oppong, 
2013a, 2013b), it is only reasonable to critically examine the paradigms that inform the 
production of such knowledge. Thus, in the ensuring paragraphs, a critique of each of 
the philosophical positions is presented. 
Ontological Position 
As indicated earlier, ontological question focuses on the nature of reality (West & Turner, 
2000) or perceptions about the world (Smith & Darlingon, 1996). There are two opposites 
1 Source: Author’s Own Construct
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that a researcher can adopt as the ontological position for any given research. On 
one hand, there are those who subscribe to the fact that reality exists independent 
of the individual perceiving it; this position is referred to as realism. This position 
characterizes both positivism (Breen & Darlaston-Jones, 2008; Smith & Darlington, 1996) and, to 
some extent, critical realism (Sayer, 1993; Lawson & Staeheli, 1991; Bergene, 2007; Pratt, 2009).   For 
instance, Smith and Darlington (1996, p.14) wrote:
Realism argues that we perceive the world as it really is, that cognition is a relation 
between subject (the perceiver) and object (the perceived), that the existence of the 
object does not depend upon the subject perceiving it. 
This suggests that reality exists out there and that the researcher’s responsibility is to 
access and assess this reality by means of “objective” data collection techniques. It 
also suggests that thoughts of people expressed through language adequate represent 
the reality. This is largely the positivist ontological position. However, critical realists 
have criticized this form of realism as naïve as it fails to appreciate the differences 
among empirical, actual, and real world (Sayer, 1993; Lawson & Staeheli, 1991; Bergene, 2007; Pratt, 
2009). The empirical world is what we observed, actual world consists of the events 
that form the basis of our observation and the real world consists of the structures 
and mechanisms that produce the events (Bergene, 2007). What the positivist does is to 
equate empirical world of data (of language) to the real world of mechanism. The 
assumption that such an independent reality exists results in the belief in a universal 
truth equally exists, a belief that has been challenged by critical realists (Lawson & Staeheli, 
1991) and postmodernists (Sayer, 1993). 
Related to this is the search of empirical regularity that characterizes the positivist 
philosophy. Owing to the fact that positivist philosophy subscribes to realism or 
naïve realism (Sayer, 1993; Lawson & Staeheli, 1991), the empirical regularity observed are 
but statistical artifacts and not a representation of the real world of mechanism. This 
is to say that any kind of relationship can be observed in a given data set but may 
make less meaning in practical terms. Again, critical realists ascribe causal powers to 
human reasons and social structures (Yeung, 1997); thus, context is important in social 
science research. This marks another point of departure from positivism.  Indeed, the 
structures and mechanisms that lie deep underneath the empirical world are “distinct 
from the patterns of events they generate, and, in turn, our experience of the events. 
In other words, mechanisms do not act actualistically, that is, they do not result in the 
same actual events or outcomes, but transfactually, meaning that they are always in 
play regardless of the outcome” (Bergene, 2007, p. 13).  
Pratt (2009, p.3) reemphasizes the point that there is the need for social science 
researchers to recognize “the notion, and degree, of ontological depth: ontology being 
the nature of things, and ontological depth being the assertion that there is more 
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to things than is immediately apparent in observation”. Thus, the simple presence 
of structure and mechanism does not necessarily mean that they would produce an 
action in the same way across time and space. Pratt (2009) further argues that because 
the mere presence of mechanisms does not generate action, context (or space and 
time) becomes important in social science research.  Despite this flaw, the naïve 
realist philosophy underlies the quantitative approaches to research that have been 
dominant over decades.   
On the other hand, idealism argues that our perception may not reflect accurately the 
world and that the nature of the perceiver may affect the object of perception; as a 
result, “we can never be absolutely sure that our perceptions of the world are accurate” 
(Smith & Darlington, 1996, p.14). This position acknowledges that perception of the world is 
constrained by who we are and even the context within which such perception takes 
place. This seems to agree with the critical realist ontological position that the world 
or reality can be analyzed at three different levels of empirical (data or observation), 
actual (events) and real (mechanisms underlying the events) worlds (Lawson & Staeheli, 
1991).  Indeed, critical realist ontology “implies that reality exists relatively or absolutely 
independently of human consciousness of it” (Bergene, 2007, p. 11). This suggests that data 
collected during research cannot adequately and accurately reflect reality and that 
universal truth cannot be derived based on empirical world.  
This philosophical position ties in with the interpretivist approach of hermeneutics 
as opposed to positivism.  In terms of methodological choices, this interpretative 
philosophy underpins the general approach of qualitative research as the focus 
is on understanding as opposed to explanations (identification of cause and effect 
relationships). However, researchers are cautioned about limits to such interpretations 
as it over-interpretation has the potential to result in what Teo (2008, 2010) terms as 
epistemological violence.  This term is coined not to refer the misuse of research in 
general but to a hermeneutic process (interpretative speculations of data) that has 
negative consequences for the ‘Other’ (Teo, 2008, p.57). This is to say that researchers and 
policy makers ought not to over-interpret  the findings of the study as that might lead 
to carrying out the impossible exercise of representing or describing the mechanisms 
giving rise to events observed (real world) based on the empirical regularities (empirical 
world). Such an enterprise may lead to epistemological violence. 
Epistemological Position
As stated earlier, epistemology focuses on what constitutes valid knowledge and how 
we can obtain such knowledge (West & Turner, 2000; Oppong, 2013). Similarly, Toohey (1952/2007) 
describes it as relating to human knowledge and its sources. There are two principal 
opposing epistemological positions, namely: positivism and anitpositivist tradition 
of interpretivism or constructivism (Breen & Darlaston-Jones, 2008; Mack, 2010). The positivist 
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philosophy holds that knowledge is objective (exists independent of the subject) 
and value-free and is obtained through the application of the scientific method. It 
aims at describing, predicting, controlling and explaining a phenomenon whiles its 
overarching objective is the production of universal laws or generalizable findings 
(Breen & Darlaston-Jones, 2008; Mack, 2010). Positivism is also characterized by hypothetico-
deductive approach of hypothesis testing, experimentation, and statistical analysis. 
However, as has been pointed out earlier, positivism is not without its limitations. The 
generalizable findings reflect naïve reality (Lawson & Staeheli, 1991). It is also challenged 
for being value-neutral as it claims. Teo (2008, 2010) has demonstrated that scientific 
psychology has not weaned itself completely of speculation as discussion of findings 
constitutes interpretative speculations. By this Teo (2008, 2010) showed that even within 
the positivist tradition, there is hermeneutics in the process of interpreting results of 
statistical analysis.  Indeed, it is during the interpretative speculation that values of the 
researcher are introduced into the research process. However, such interpretations 
are not viewed as the researcher’s interpretations but assume epistemological status 
as knowledge in the same way as the data that gave rise to such interpretations.
It can be intimated that social science research that has been informed by positivist 
philosophy can best be described as positivist-hermeneutic.  This is to say that it is not 
possible to carry out any social science research project and avoid interpretations. 
Thus, it is reasonable to educate young scholars outside the existing epistemic centres 
to embrace informed interpretations as part of their research. This also questions 
the existence of any universal, objective truth as the truth is interpretations of other 
social science researchers from their privileged positions of their ethno-philosophies 
or world-views. In other words, different truths exist according to who interpret the 
results of any social science research.  
On the other hand, the interpretivist philosophy holds that reality can never be 
objectively observed from the outside; as a result, it must be observed from inside 
through the direct experience of the people. It also posits that no universal laws can be 
established in the study of human behaviour or social sciences though it is possible in 
the natural sciences uniform (Mack, 2010). Thus, the researcher’s role is to “understand, 
explain, and demystify social reality through the eyes of different participants” (Cohen, 
Manion, & Morrison, 2007, p.19). Hermeneutics and phenomenology represents different 
strands of interpretivism (Mack, 2010). 
One limitation of interpretivism is that “it abandons the scientific procedures of 
verification and therefore results cannot be generalized to other situations” (Mack, 
2010, p.8). Yet, the search for generalization or universal truth in the form of empirical 
regularities has been shown to be futile by critical realists (Bergene, 2007; Pratt, 2009). For 
instance, psychological studies, which over the years have been informed by the 
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positivist philosophy, have been shown to be inaccurate description of behaviours 
in all contexts. This has given rise to cross-cultural psychological research which has 
continually shown that many psychological principles and concepts are not culturally 
universal (Matsumoto & Juang, 2004). It has also given rise to the emergence of indigenous 
psychology movement which ensures that psychological studies embrace and 
account for the culture (Oppong, Oppong Asante & Kumako, 2013; Oppong, under review).  Similarly, 
interpretivist-oriented social science research tends to inform and improve practice 
(Padgett, 2004). 
Epistemologically, the critical realists also prescribe the use of extensive and intensive 
methods. 
Pratt (2009) argues that this epistemological prescription was based on Sayer’s (1984) 
statement that argues for the combination of intensive and extensive methods. 
According to Pratt (2009, p. 10), extensive methods are “usually glossed as sample data 
collections of whole populations: this shows generalized outcomes. Intensive methods, 
using fine-grained qualitative approaches, are usually advocated for examining the 
causal processes. The argument was that intensive and extensive approaches should 
be used to complement one another”.  Thus, the epistemological prescription from 
critical realism is a mixed method in which census studies rather than sample surveys 
constitute the extensive method and a qualitative component that investigates 
the underlying causal process.  Thus, in practical terms a critical realist-informed 
epistemological advice will be:
 - collect data from representative sample and apply statistical techniques that 
enable you to generate the population parameters from the sample estimates 
and
 - use grounded theory methodology to uncover the causal process of the empirical 
regularities observed in the quantitative phase.
This leaves out the interpretative speculation that leads to epistemological violence 
(see Teo, 2008, 2010) The grounded theory approach has been described as a “qualitative 
research design in which the inquirer generates a general explanation (theory) of 
a process, an action, or an interaction shaped by the views of a large number of 
participants” (Creswell, 2013, p. 83). 
Again, as alternative bodies of knowledge are sought by scholars in non-western 
societies to support nation-building, qualitative inquiries can facilitate the production 
of context-relevant or context-specific knowledge. This becomes very important 
as existing knowledge have failed to provide policy-makers and scholars from non-
western societies context relevant knowledge (Oppong, 2013a).  This is to say that non-
western scholars should become more concerned with uncovering truths that are 
relevant to their context rather a blind search for empirical regularities towards a 
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non-existing universal truth. Non-western social science researchers also stand to 
gain from following the derived epistemological prescriptions of mixed methods with 
representative sample studies with inferential statistics and grounded theory design 
with a focus on uncovering the underlying causal process observed through the 
quantitative study. Thus, non-western scholars should develop competences in the 
use of qualitative research methods to support the efforts of developing endogenous 
theories or model for improvement of the livelihood of the members of the societies. 
Axiological Position
Axiology focuses on the place of values in the research process (West & Turner, 2000). There 
different positions associated with axiology:
 - science must be value-free and
 - it is not possible to eliminate values form any part of science, and
 - values are not only inevitable but desirable aspects of the research process. 
The position that science must be value-free is associated with the positivist 
philosophy (Breen & Darlaston-Jones, 2008; Mack, 2010; West & Turner, 2000). This is because the 
positivist philosophy which dominates social science claims to be objective and as a 
result, its practitioners ought to not allow their values influence the research process. 
Notwithstanding, there are other researchers who hold the position that it is not 
possible to entirely eliminate values from the research process (West & Turner, 2000). They 
argue that “some values are so embedded in researchers’ culture that researchers are 
unconscious that they hold them” (West & Turner, 2000, p.49).  However, the third position 
which holds that values are not only inevitable but desirable aspects of the research 
process further compounds the debate by offering three different positions (West & 
Turner, 2000). These are:
 - Avoid values that influence verification
 - Recognize how values influence the entire research process
 - Advocate that values should be closely intertwined with the research process
The axiological position that ought to be adopted in social inquiry is that values have 
always influenced social science research; as a result, researchers should admit and 
deliberately include their cultural orientation in the research process. This is because 
Teo (2008, 2010) has demonstrated that speculation was and is still part of scientific 
psychological research and this manifests itself in interpretative speculation or 
discussion of results obtained from the analyses of quantitative data. 
Again, it ought to be held in the social inquiry process that social science has 
imperialistic tendencies (Ake, 2012; Teo & Febbraro, 2003; Teo, 2008, 2010) and that current 
social science paradigms are Anglo-Saxon, Christian-centric, patriarchal, capitalist, 
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hetero-normative and racially hierarchized (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Oppong, 2012). Indeed, Teo 
and Febbraro (2003, p.676) wrote:
Psychologists usually, quasi-naturally, perceive psychological phenomena based on 
how they have experienced them and how they have learned to perceive them in their 
particular cultural context, which includes their academic institutions. In this sense, 
epistemological ethnocentrism is an a priori principle before any empirical research is 
conducted (and ‘empirical research’ itself assumes a particular cultural perspective).
Teo (2010, p.298) made similar comments in respect of the empirical sciences as 
perpetuating what he describes as epistemological violence (EV); it arises whenever 
“theoretical interpretations regarding empirical results implicitly or explicitly construct 
the Other as inferior or problematic, despite the fact that alternative interpretations, 
equally viable based on the data, are available”.  He further argues that EV is a practice 
that is executed in empirical articles empirical social sciences. Indeed, Teo (2011, p.195) 
has argued that positivist theory (that applied logic and mathematics) is “ideological 
in hiding the social function of science, the social formation of facts, and the historical 
character of research objects”.
As a result, there is an urgent need to decolonize social science (Ndhlovu, 2013; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2013); it is against this background that such a decolonial epistemic perspective 
ought to be adopted in the social inquiry process by non-western scholars. Indeed, 
Ndhlovu (2013) argues that African scholars should not be oblivious to the invisible 
hierarchies of linguistic and racial arrangements that underpin the global designs within 
which knowledge production and dissemination take place. Thus, it is futile to attempt 
to project value-free research findings. The decolonial epistemic perspective is critical 
of mainstream or western social science. Consequently, it rightly assumes that though 
the process of colonialism (in all its forms) has ended, there remains a legacy of an 
unbalanced power “that produces, uses and legitimizes differences between societies 
and forms of knowledge” that operates to the present day (Ndhlovu, 2013, p.16). It has 
been suggested that interventions at indigenizing knowledge will involve adopting a 
problem-centred approach to research and using oral literature (folktales, proverbs, 
and ethnic cosmologies) as frame of reference (Mate-Kole, 2013; Oppong, 2013a, 2013b; Oppong & 
Oppong, 2012): As a result, African folk and philosophical psychologies should be adopted 
as part of the framework for understanding and guiding social science research. 
Besides, the discussion that the researcher should not allow his or her values to 
influence the research process can be shown to be the result of the naïve realism of 
the positivist philosophy. Failure of the positivist philosophy to recognize that empirical 
regularity does not tell us anything about the mechanisms that may be giving rise 
to such observation and failure to appreciate the existence of degrees of ontology 
produces such axiological position. This is to say that because positivist philosophy 
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has no appreciation for degree of ontological depth (Pratt, 2009) and equates what is 
observed to what reality is (Bergene, 2007), there is also the possibility that positivists 
would also hold the belief that the observed equals the underlying mechanisms. Thus, 
there is a high tendency for positivists to also believe that a given empirical regularity 
observed would hold regardless of the context. This has led to a situation where 
many of the concepts in social science disciplines built on the positivist philosophy 
have been shown to lack ecological validity – degree of applicability of research 
findings to people and settings other those in a given research. This suggests that any 
contemporary social science research that fails to take in account the cultural milieu of 
the research participants and settings and temporality still operates under the illusion 
of the positivist’s naïve realism.   
An illustration will suffice. Based on the thesis of communalism presented by Gyekye 
(2003), Nukunya (2003) and Assimeng (2007), the author sought to formulate a more 
culture-relevant understanding of Ghanaian managers’ willingness to engage in 
corporate social responsibility (see Figure 2). Gyekye’s (2003) argues that communalism 
finds its greatest expression within the family context. It is expected that managers 
are more likely to make CSR decision if it is likely to impact their immediate family 
members than when it will affect an entire community. 
 
Family
Neighbourhood
Communities
Non-location-based
Communities
Society
Figure 2: Ecological Zones of Relevance for Decision-Making and Actions2 
Indeed, this axiological position is consistent with the efforts to indigenize psychology 
(Mate-Kole, 2013; Oppong, 2013a, 2013b; Oppong, Oppong, & Steve, 2013; Oppong & Oppong, 2012; Oppong, 
Under Review). Thus, this axiological position enables the researcher to develop and test 
hypotheses and models that reflect the understanding of behaviour within the local 
frame of reference. As a result, it increases the ecological validity of results of social 
science research in non-western societies. 
2 Source: Author’s Own Construct
S. OppOng - A Critique Of the philOSOphiCAl underpinningS Of MAinStreAM SOCiAl SCienCe reSeArCh   251
Alternative Philosophical Positions 
So what alternatives exist for the non-western scholars? Social science researchers 
will have to examine their own ontology as to whether a reality exists out there for 
them to uncover. It is important to appreciate that no absolute truths exist that can be 
discovered. This is because so-called universal truths happen to be the interpretations 
given to observations by others (Teo, 2008) and such interpretations often misrepresent 
the other by way of epistemological violence (Teo, 2010). Thus, the non-western 
social science researcher must position himself or herself to project his or her on 
interpretations as alternative to the imported interpretations of the western scholars. 
Thus, there is a need for researchers to become open to social science disciplines that 
encourages “plura-versalims” or “multi-versalism” that recognizes relative truths. This 
then compels the non-western scholar to view imported truths from western scholars 
as other interpretations and evaluate them accordingly.
Following from this ontological position of “multiversal” realities, non-western scholars 
should adopt a positivist-hermeneutic philosophy and axiological position that seeks 
to incorporate their endogenous paradigms or ethno-philosophies. This is to say that 
scholars outside the Anglo-American epistemic centres should abandon their current 
purely positivist orientation that seeks to eliminate interpretations. In response, such 
scholars should deliberately adopt and appropriate their cultural world-views in the 
conduct of social science research. The purpose is to ensure that the ‘hermeneutic’ 
element of the positivist-hermeneutic orientations derives from the ‘local’ instead of 
a non-existing ‘global’ worldview. This caution derives from the suggestion by Yankah 
(2012) that globalization means nothing more than the promotion of one local culture 
to the world stage and Ake’s (2012) concern that development, in the final analysis, 
reduces to westernization. Thus, an axiological position that accepts values as part of 
research should be adopted for social science research in non-western societies.
Epistemologically, the adoption of mixed method design is highly recommended. 
In this context, the social science researcher would benefit more from the critical 
realist prescriptions. Thus, the design should combine the traditional quantitative 
techniques with grounded theory method or any other qualitative design that enables 
researchers to uncover the causal process. However, grounded theory method is 
highly recommended here given that, at the current limits of our knowledge, it is the 
qualitative method that enables researchers to generate a theory or an explanation 
about the process (Creswel, 2013). 
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Conclusion 
This paper sought to critically explore the philosophical underpinnings of the social 
science research. In particular, ontological, epistemological and axiological positions 
often adopted in social science research were examined. It was pointed out that 
the oppositions between realism and idealism on one hand and positivism and 
interpretivism on the other are needless as both positions have inherent strengths 
and shortfalls. However, it was intimated that since values have also been part of 
social science research, the axiological position that researchers should adopt is one 
that deliberately include their cultural orientation. It is, however, important to note 
that overall the interpretations and applications of the theories should be influenced 
by a decolonial epistemic perspective. Epistemologically, a mixed method design 
combining the traditional quantitative techniques with grounded theory method is 
recommended.
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